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Nationalist and regionalist parties have often been characterised as ideologically 
heterogeneous (Hix and Lord, 1997; De Winter and Türsan, 1998). This situation 
makes regionalist parties difficult to classify in conventional left-right terms though 
viewing these parties as an ideological family is to misunderstand their role and 
significance. Ideological profile can be understood as a secondary characteristic of 
regionalist parties, as opposed to their primary characteristic of support for self-
government – the core business of autonomy (De Winter, 1998, 208-9): which in 
itself contains a variety of constitutional options to reorganise the territorial 
distribution of power within a state (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983). However, though 
ideological positioning may be a secondary characteristic, most regionalist parties 
have adopted an ideology – in the SNP’s case social democracy.  As will be explained 
below, the reasons for adopting an ideology in itself, in addition to a particular 
ideology, are complex. For the SNP, the ideological position of elites, the policy 
preferences of the party’s membership and the adoption of an electoral strategy to 
challenge a dominant political party in the region (Labour) were all influential. The 
adoption of an ideological position was not always uncontroversial but became easier 
due to party system change (the electoral decline of the Conservatives in Scotland 
from the 1960s), as the SNP came to focus much of its attention on Labour as its 
primary competitor. This strategy became successful in the 1980s and 1990s as voters 
began to recognise the SNP as a left of centre party, with quite similar policy 
preferences to Labour. 
 
However, in the period following the SNP’s ideological consolidation in the 1990s, 
the party faced a changing political environment as Labour’s catch-all strategy 
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(involving policy triangulation with the Conservatives) become very successful in 
accessing a broader spectrum of voters in Scotland (Saren and McCormick, 2004). In 
addition, new parties such as the Scottish Socialists and Greens emerged to become 
competitive at Scottish elections and the new electoral system for the Scottish 
Parliament provided multiple competitors and challenges to seat targeting, which 
placed obstacles in the way of the SNP’s goal of becoming a party of government. In 
essence, the SNP was faced with adapting to party system change as well as multi-
level elections in a short period of time, accompanied by the creation of the Scottish 
parliament in 1999. Specifically, this paper will argue that, whilst the SNP eventually 
settled into a consensual mode regarding its ideological position, ideology has 
become less important to the SNP (and to the electorate) and the party has ceased to 
stress its ideological position in explicit terms. Thus in recent times, the SNP has 
moved from identifying itself with the social democratic mainstream in the mid-1990s 
to de-emphasising its social democracy and adopting policies across the left-right 
spectrum to compete with different parties and especially with New Labour. 
However, this is not merely a result of changes in party strategy and the party system 
but also due to the changing shape of the electorate and the policy similarities 
between the parties in period of ideological depolarisation, which facilitated the 
SNP’s voter maximalisation efforts at the 2007 election. 
 
The majority of this article will look at the issue of ideological change within the SNP 
in historical perspective, specifically the gradual emergence of ideological influences 
within the party and its move towards social democracy in phases from the early 
1960s. However, before looking at ideological change, it will also focus on the 
contextual factors of adaptation to party system change and participation in multi-
level electoral settings – as these are important considerations guiding the party’s 
ideological development. In addition, the article will provide a brief assessment of the 
SNP’s role in multi-level governance since its election victory in 2007, especially to 
see whether office success has moderated the SNP’s territorial goals. 
 
Adaptation to Party System Change 
 
Whilst the 1950s were the highpoint of two-party politics in Scotland (and in Britain), 
the 1960s produced considerable party system change through the electoral 
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emergence of the SNP, the re-emergence of the Liberals and decline of the 
Conservatives (see table 1). The two party system was challenged most notably by the 
rise of the SNP at the general elections of February and October 1974 in which it 
grew rapidly to 30.4% of the votes, pushing the Conservatives into third place and 
taking seats from the Tories. Following splits in the Labour Party in 1981 and the 
emergence of the Social Democratic Party, the two main parties faced another third 
party challenge in 1983, with the growth of the Liberal-SDP Alliance to third place 
and 24.5% of the vote. And, significantly, this party also won seats from the 
Conservatives. Moreover, in the following decade, the Conservative’s electoral 
decline plus a trend towards anti-Conservative voting became more common. In a 
number of seats, tactical voting by supporters of the SNP, Labour and Liberal parties 
reduced the number of Conservative seats from 21 to 10 in 1987 and then from 11 to 
0 in 1997. Such developments markedly altered the ideological environment for all 
parties over time and the political opportunity structure for the SNP. 
 
 
Table 1. UK General election Results for Scotland, 1945-2005. 
 
Year  Conservative Labour  Lib Dem SNP 
  Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats 
1945  41.1 27 49.4 40 5 0 1.2 0 
1950  44.8 32 46.2 32 6.6 2 0.4 0 
1951  48.6 35 47.9 35 2.7 1 0.3 0 
1955  50.1 36 46.7 34 1.9 1 0.5 0 
1959  47.2 31 46.7 38 4.1 1 0.5 0 
1964  40.6 24 48.7 43 7.6 4 2.4 0 
1966  37.7 20 49.9 46 6.8 5 5 0 
1970  38 23 44.5 44 5.5 3 11.4 1 
1974 (F) 32.9 21 36.6 41 8 3 21.9 7 
1974 (O) 24.7 16 36.3 41 8.3 3 30.4 11 
1979  31.4 22 41.5 44 9 3 17.3 2 
1983  28.4 21 35.1 41 24.5 8 11.7 2 
1987  24 10 42.4 50 19.2 9 14 3 
1992  25.7 11 39 49 13.1 9 21.5 3 
1997  17.5 0 45.6 56 13 10 22.1 6 
2001  15.58 1 43.26 55 16.37 10 20.06 5 
2005*  15.8 1 38.9 40 22.6 11 17.6 6 
* The number of Scottish seats at Westminster was reduced from 72 to 59 for this 





Of course, whilst the Conservatives declined and third parties emerged, the one 
constant in the electoral picture was Labour, which managed to maintain its position 
as Scotland’s leading party at every national election from 1964 onwards (it also won 
more seats than the Tories in 1959 in Scotland) until 2007. Labour’s electoral 
performance was strong and its level of representation aided by the first past the post 
electoral system. However, this situation changed with devolution in 1999 (see table 
2). The electoral system for Scottish elections (AMS using first past the post and 
regional list PR) made Labour a minority in the Scottish Parliament and reliant upon a 
coalition partner to enter government (hence two Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition 
governments from 1999-2007). In addition, the electoral system plus changes in party 
support transformed the SNP from a marginal party at UK elections to the main 
opposition party in the Scottish Parliament – recasting Scottish politics as a contest 
between the SNP and Labour. This new reality manifested itself most clearly when 
the SNP came first in the Scottish elections in 2007, relegated Labour – marginally – 
into second place in seats and votes – and entered government for the first time. 
 
Table 2. Scottish Election Results (constituency votes plus total seat count), 1999-
2007  
 
Conservative  Labour     Lib Dem SNP   Others 
 Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats 
1999  15.5 18 38.8 56 14.2 17 28.7 35 2.8       3 
2003  16.6 18 34.6 50 15.4 17 23.8 27 9.8 17 
2007 16.6 17 32 46 16 16 32.9 47 2.5     3 
% refers to constituency vote only. Others – Greens, independents, Scottish Socialists 
for example - received most seats on the regional list vote.  
 
 
The emergence of the SNP as a serious competitor to Labour was not the only party 
system change to come with devolution. The new electoral system also saw the 
success of new political actors in gaining institutional representation in Scotland. The 
first Scottish elections in 1999 saw 3 MSPs from outwith the main parties – one 
independent, one Green and one from the Scottish Socialist Party. This development 
 5 
became more pronounced in 2003, when there was considerable voter 
experimentation outside the four traditional parties, especially on the regional list 
vote. Independents and small parties picked up 9.8% of the constituency vote and 2 
seats as well as 22.3% of vote and 15 seats on the regional list (with the SNP as one 
of the main losers). This outcome was not repeated at the 2007 election. At that 
election, only 2 Green MSPs and one independent were elected and the SNP’s 
electoral success saw it pick up a large number of seats on the regional list at the 
expense of the small parties. The party’s electoral success can be attributed to a 
specific regional list strategy based around the party leader, Alex Salmond, the 
spectacular implosion of the Scottish Socialist Party and the SNP’s success in casting 
the election as a two-party contest against Labour and effectively projecting itself as 
an alternative government, which helped concentrate voters’ minds to cast protest 
votes or votes for change in the direction of the SNP. Ideological factors were not 
unimportant in 2007 and will be explored in great detail later in the article. 
 
Multilevel Elections and Multilevel Governance 
 
The SNP has had a differentiated level of performance in multilevel electoral settings 
– though a pronounced capacity to perform better at some electoral levels than others. 
The party’s performance in different electoral settings can be divided into four 
distinct time periods. First, from 1934 into the mid-1960s, the SNP was an extremely 
marginal electoral actor, meaning it seldom contested seats at UK general elections or 
in local elections. Second, from the 1960s to 1970s, the SNP appeared a much more 
serious political force, in contesting Westminster elections (most spectacularly in the 
two general elections in 1974) and in fighting and winning seats in local councils, 
especially at local and regional council elections in 1977 and 1978 (Lynch 2001: 
212). Third, the advent of direct elections to the European Parliament from 1979 
onwards provided a new electoral setting for the SNP and one in which it managed to 
outperform its UK election total. In 1979, the SNP’s European result was 19.4% 
compared to 17.3% for Westminster. This gap increased in 1984  (17.8% to 11.4%), 
1989 (25.6% to 14%) and 1994 (32.6% to 21.5%), before devolution added a new 
multilevel setting in 1999. The SNP’s European performances were accompanied by 
policy development in relation to the EU and to the reshaping of the party’s central 
goal of Scottish independence to take account of the relaunch of the EU after the 
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Single European Act. Fourth, the first elections to the Scottish Parliament in 1999 saw 
a similar picture to that of Europe when compared to the party’s performance at UK 
elections (which John Curtice has referred to as the ‘Holyrood gap’), with the SNP 
winning 28.7% of the constituency vote in 1999, followed by 23.7% in 2003 and then 
32.9% in 2007. However, this multi-level setting was significantly different in that the 
elections made the SNP the principle opposition party and alternative government in 
Scotland – something not possible at Westminster or the European Parliament – and 
led the party into minority government in 2007. Simultaneously, the adoption of 
proportional representation for local elections in 2007 helped the SNP to become the 
biggest party in Scottish local government with the largest number of councillors and 
a governing role in 13 of Scotland’s 32 local authorities. Therefore the new 
institutional setting of the Scottish Parliament and electoral system changes to the 
local setting transformed the SNP’s position. 
 
Success in the 2007 Scottish election has had two linked effects, on the SNP and on 
its main political competitors. First, the SNP’s independence strategy post-devolution 
relied upon gaining power in the Scottish government and then using office as a 
mechanism to hold an independence referendum. The party formed a minority 
government in May 2007, published a white paper on Scotland’s constitutional 
options in 2007 (Scottish Government 2007), launched a consultation process on 
Scotland’s constitutional future,i and planned an independence referendum for 2010. 
Second, the SNP’s success generated policy co-operation between Labour, Liberal 
Democrats and the Conservatives over amending the devolution settlement to grant 
more autonomy to the Scottish government. These parties launched a Scottish 
Constitutional Commission in April 2008 to examine proposals for more policy and 
taxation powers for Scotland.ii 
 
A Brief Guide to Ideology in the SNP 
 
The SNP did not have a clear ideological position until the 1980s – the period when 
the party sought to present itself as a left-of-centre in explicit terms through policy 
and party publicity. Before then, there were some ideological traditions within the 
party – such as social democracy emerging in the 1960s and 1970s – but the SNP did 
not seek to present itself as an ideological party. As will be discussed below, the SNP 
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was not born with an ideology in 1934, but for an important part of its history it was 
seen to be governed by a ‘ruling myth’ that it was neither of the left or the right but 
constituted a new politics that sought to put Scotland first (Brand, 1990: 28). For 
example, party propaganda in the 1960s stated that:  
 
The National Party stands for the nation; all sections, all people in it; 
welded in a common purpose; devoted, dedicated to the social and 
economic improvement of all………..Instead of asking us to put our own 
country first, the Labour, Tory and Liberal parties divide Scotland against 
herself. These parties ask us Scots to give our prime loyalty to their 
outdated Anglo-Scottish sectional and class interests (SNP 1966: 5). 
 
Party elites and members were keen to promote a unique place for the SNP within the 
electoral marketplace, rather than advance the same ideological position as the 
Unionist parties of Conservative and Labour. The myth was particularly potent in the 
1960s and 1970s. At the two general elections of 1974 (February and October) eight 
of the SNP’s eleven seats had been won from the Conservatives. This situation 
reinforced the ruling myth by making it appear as if the SNP had won support from 
Conservative defectors and that keeping these new voters within the SNP necessitated 
a neutral stance on ideology and class. However, what was clear at the time and 
subsequently, was that the SNP victories in Conservative seats were a result of the 
party’s success in attracting an anti-Conservative coalition of former Labour and 
Liberal voters to help oust sitting Tories in seats such as Moray and Nairn, Galloway 
and Upper Nithsdale and Aberdeenshire East (Lynch, 2002: 132). However, 
convincing sitting MPs that this was the case proved next to impossible and their 
perceptions and actions within the House of Commons did not help the SNP to project 
a clear political identity in relation to ideology. 
 
However, the ideological debate within the party was not merely about ideology and 
it would be wrong to suggest that the party was characterised by an ongoing conflict 
between right and left. In fact, the debate was more about the SNP being distinct – a 
national movement with new politics – rather than another UK-based party of 
sectional interests and also one that needed to be an all-Scotland movement. It was 
also influenced by the ‘independence nothing less’ view within the party, especially 
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evident within the old guard from the 1950s, which saw detailed policies as a 
distraction from independence (Brand, 1990: 25). This itself was a reflection of 
divisions within the party about whether it should exist as a national movement for 
independence that contained all shades of political opinion or a political party with 
detailed policies (Mitchell, 1990).  
 
Such internal complexities were obstacles that prevented the SNP from adopting a 
clear ideological position for much of its history, but it did not last forever. At both of 
the general elections of 1974 – at the SNP’s electoral peak - the SNP election 
manifesto had proclaimed the SNP as a social democratic party and proposed a range 
of social democratic policies (Lynch, 2002: 133). There was even an aborted attempt 
to change the SNP’s name to the Scottish National Party (Social Democrats) at the 
1975 annual conference.iii Whilst the SNP faced ideological and strategic conflict in 
the post-1979 period – with the rise of the Socialist 79 group – these developments 
gave way to as clearer and less controversial ideological position. As early as 1982, 
SNP literature described the organisation as ‘a moderate, centre-left party’ (Brand, 
1990: 27), leading to the more elegant statement that appeared on the SNP website in 
recent years that proclaimed the SNP as ‘a democratic left-of-centre political party 
committed to Scottish Independence. It aims to create a just, caring and enterprising 
society by releasing Scotland's full potential as an independent nation in the 
mainstream of modern Europe.’iv However, arguably, this ideological position – 
whilst recognised by voters – has become less important and effectively de-
emphasised by the SNP in the more ideologically fluid post-devolution period. This 
development will be dealt with at the close of the next section, which outlines the 
SNP’s ideological development since its formation in 1934. 
 
From No Ideology to Social Democracy and Back Again? Five Phases in the 
SNP’s Ideological Development 
 
It is possible to identify five distinct ideological phases in the life span of the SNP 
from the 1930s to the 2007, which demonstrate the SNP’s transition from a non-
ideological position, to adopting social democracy and a centre-left perspective to 
entering a post-devolution period in which ideological considerations were less 
important: a fact shared by the party’s competitors. These phases did not fall into 
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strictly separate timescales but are overlapping. For example, some such as the non-
ideological centrist and social democratic period overlap quite strongly in terms of 
issues and personnel. However, the different phases are intended as a guide to the 
main events and developments – and especially political contexts - that gave rise to 
ideological change within the SNP. They are also clearly indicative of adaptation to a 
changing party system and to highly competitive multi-level elections. 
 
SNP Formation In 1934 the SNP’s formation saw a number of different 
ideological perspectives and existing parties merge to establish the new party but 
provided it with no clear position on the left-right scale. Though political parties can 
be understood as organisations that are established by and attract people with similar 
political opinions (Ware, 1996: 4), in the case of the SNP, this opinion involved the 
importance of Scottish self-government rather than a political ideology. The SNP’s 
founders were united over self-government in principle, though not its exact nature 
(the differing options of devolution, home rule and independence) or the best strategic 
means to achieve self-government. The Scottish National Party was formed through 
the amalgamation of the National Party for Scotland (NPS) and the Scottish Party. 
Each of these merging parties had different ideological perspectives. Whilst the NPS 
was left of centre, the Scottish Party formed in 1932 was more right-wing in terms of 
policy and membership and, to all extents and purposes, existed as a party of notables 
from the Conservatives and Liberals rather than an organisation with a broad 
membership (Brand, 1978: 216-7). Thus, the SNP initially contained contrasting 
ideological forces within its ranks, at the level of the party’s élite and its membership. 
The internal distribution of ideological views necessitated some compromises about 
the party’s programme that blurred its distinctiveness. However, the real divisions 
between the NPS and Scottish Party were about attitudes to independence and 
devolution and to contesting elections rather than about ideology (Finlay, 1994). 
Moreover, ideological debate within both the NPS and the Scottish Party seems to 
have been limited. For example, even though the National Party of Scotland was more 
left wing than the Scottish Party, little serious policy work was done by the NPS 
especially in relation to the economy. The central concern of the NPS, not 
surprisingly, was the issue of independence: an obvious fact that influenced the 
content of SNP debates and policy too. 
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Centrism in the 1930s to 1960s In the period from the 1930s to the 1960s the SNP 
presented itself as a moderate centrist party, attempting to stand aside from class 
conflict and seeking to win electoral support as a ‘third party’ alternative to the 
Liberals and profit from dissatisfaction with the two main parties. Whilst clear 
policies were thin on the ground at the time of the party’s creation, they were in place 
by 1938 and restated in clearer form in 1946, though not in great detail. However, the 
real issues that exercised the SNP in this period were: attitudes to contesting elections 
versus pressurising other parties to take self-government seriously; alliances and co-
operation with parties such as the Liberals; the SNP’s position on neutrality, entry 
into the war and the issue of conscription; and dual membership between the SNP and 
other parties (Brand, 1978: 231-2; Finlay, 1994). After the war ended, the party 
developed a more serious interest in policy, organisation and membership, with an 
Aims and Policy statement in 1946 and new party constitution in 1948. Policy from 
1946 was radical and redistributionist in relation to land and in favour of ‘the 
diffusion of economic power’, including the decentralisation of industries such as coal 
to include the involvement of local authorities and regional planning bodies to control 
industrial structure and development.v The document generally supported the status 
quo in relation to the economy and social policy, with its main emphasis being the 
transfer of power from UK to Scottish government rather than any transfer of power 
within Scotland. The decentralist ethos evident in the policy statement sat alongside 
support for state intervention in many areas. This latter policy may reflect the wartime 
orthodoxy of central planning and has existed within SNP policy for decades ever 
since.vi However, what the policy statement certainly did not contain were 
commitments to the redistribution of wealth or anything resembling Socialist or 
Social democratic language or clear policy commitments. This is not to attempt to 
place it on the right however, because it didn’t contain free market language or ideas 
either.  
 
The political context in which the SNP found itself in the post-1945 period was not 
one that facilitated clear ideological choices for the party. Certainly, internally, the 
SNP was centrist and did not contain influential figures keen to move it to the left or 
right. However, the distribution of electoral support in Scotland made it difficult to 
provide a political logic for developing a clear profile. Three specific factors in 
relation to the party system in Scotland were important for the SNP and its placement 
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in the left-right scale from the period from 1945 to 1962. First, the SNP was seeking – 
and failing – to compete in a two-party system in which the Scottish Unionists 
(Conservatives) and Labour did not so much dominate post-war elections as 
monopolise them. In 1945, the two main parties gained 88.7% of the vote, rising to 
91% in 1950, 96.5% in 1951, 96.8% in 1955 before slipping back to 93.8% in 1959. 
In these circumstances, there wasn’t much of a third party vote to attract or much 
political logic in shaping the SNP as either left or right in ideological terms to 
challenge either Labour or the Unionists - the party had to try to challenge them both 
on the issue of self-government. Partisan dealignment in the 1960s altered this 
situation markedly to the SNP’s benefit. 
 
Second, the policy choices of the two main parties limited the space for the SNP in a 
period of consensus politics. The SNP, as well as any other third party, lacked a 
cutting edge in policy terms as the two big parties experienced substantial levels of 
electoral popularity through adopting similar policies with state intervention in a 
mixed economy, nationalisation, extensive public house-building programmes, etc. 
The SNP adopted similar policies and accepted much of the post-war consensus in 
relation to its policy programme, which further blurred any cutting edge. Moreover, 
though the issue of self-government found considerable expression in this period 
through the National Covenant campaign in the early 1950s, the issue did not feed 
into party politics in the way of votes for the SNP. It was not until the decline of the 
Scottish economy in the late 1950s that the party was able to promote self-
government and the Scottish dimension to policy as viable political alternatives: 
which partly explains the SNP’s emergence in industrial Scotland in the 1960s.  
 
Third, whilst there was very little political space in which to operate between the two 
main parties, there was a formerly Liberal electorate available given the 
organisational decline of the Liberals across Scotland. It was this electorate that the 
SNP sought to attract. For instance, the Liberals only contested five seats out of 
seventy-one at the 1955 general election, meaning that Liberal voters didn’t actually 
have a Liberal candidate to vote for (though some could vote for National Liberals in 
alliance with the Scottish Unionists). In the 1950s this electorate was small but in the 
1960s it grew with the dealignment of the party system evident in the growing vote of 
both the Liberals and SNP in the 1964 and 1966 general elections.vii In addition, the 
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idea of dealignment itself – in class and electoral terms – caused difficulties for the 
adoption of an ideological identity too. What would be the point of adopting a clear 
ideological profile and position on the class divide, just as those divisions were 
breaking down?  
 
The Rise of Social Democracy A social democratic tradition began to emerge 
within the SNP in the 1960s but only became explicit in the 1970s. This development 
had a number of origins. First, internally, the SNP recruited a large number of centre-
left members, may of whom came to occupy prominent positions within the party’s 
leadership structures and serve as parliamentary candidates. In the 1960s, the party 
grew in urban, industrial Scotland and experienced an influx of social democrats from 
the Labour Party, the trade unions and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
(Mitchell, 1996: 208). Billy Wolfe’s performance at the West Lothian by-election in 
1962 was an example of this phenomenon (Wolfe 1973). This process continued in 
the 1970s and aided the emergence of a younger generation of Socialists who formed 
the 79 Group and became prominent in the SNP in the early 1980s. Some members 
joined the SNP from the defunct Scottish Labour Party in 1979 (Drucker, 1978), 
whilst others joined from Labour over issues such as the poll tax in the late 1980s.viii 
Generational change was also important in terms of new members and the political 
retirement of older generations. As the older generation of traditionalists within the 
SNP retired or became less active they were unable to resist the policy preferences of 
the new more left-wing generations that came into the SNP in the 1970s (Brand, 
1990: 32).  
 
Second, the Scottish party system had shifted in the late 1950s to become more 
obviously Labour in terms of electoral support and representation. Labour won 38 
seats in 1959 on 46.7%, even though the Conservatives gained marginally more votes. 
From then on however, Labour led the polls at every general election in Scotland with 
a clear majority of the seats (usually more than 40 out of 72) and the Conservative’s 
period of competitiveness with Labour was over. Targeting Labour through 
emphasising left of centre policies and values was therefore electorally logical as well 
as tying in with the ideological preferences of many new members in the 1960s. The 
SNP therefore followed the political logic of the times in terms of competing in a 
centre-left country as well as its own internal distribution of ideological opinion. 
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Learning this lesson took time however. Some within the party argued that the SNP 
was winning significant numbers of votes from the Conservatives in the 1960s and 
1970s and should avoid adopting an ideological position. The party won seats and 
votes from the Conservatives, who appeared in serious decline, so fudging the SNP’s 
ideological position was seen to be advantageous. However, given the dominant 
position of the Labour Party and the seemingly inexorable decline of the anti-Home 
Rule Conservatives, there was little prospect of the SNP actually aligning with the 
ideological right. 
 
The rise in social democratic ideas was not just driven by new members and electoral 
strategy it was also driven by policymaking changes within the SNP organisation. 
First, at an expanded party headquarters, there was much more focus on producing 
detailed policies which could be used for publicity purposes, candidate briefings, 
press releases, election literature, etc. Some of this work was undertaken by Billy 
Wolfe as a part-time research director, producing economic material in particular 
through the medium of the Social and Economic Inquiry Society of Scotland: a group 
of SNP supporters from the business and academic community who provided policy 
advice and briefings for the SNP. The group assisted in hosting a series of seminars 
on energy, science, land use, agriculture and the Scottish economy (Wolfe, 1973: 64). 
The level of policy debate and expertise rose as a result. Moreover, Billy Wolfe’s 
election as party leader in 1969 was seen as an endorsement of a policy-focused SNP 
(Miller, 1981: 47), as opposed to one that would stay neutral on policy (and ideology) 
until there was a Scottish parliament in place to make detailed policy. 
 
Second, the existing range of SNP policies was gathered together into an accessible 
brochure – SNP & You – which was first drafted in 1964 and distributed from 1966 
onwards. The document adopted Wolfe’s amended name for the SNP – SNP: The 
Democratic Party – in order to emphasis democracy and participation rather than 
nationalism. The document contained contained commitments to full employment, 
government intervention in fuel, power and transport, a state bank to guide economic 
development, encouragement of co-operatives and credit unions, extensive 
housebuilding by central and local government, pensions adjusted to cost of living, a 
minimum wage and an improved national health service. What this all adds up to is a 
party with centre-left policies, even though it pitched itself as a new politics party 
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beyond class politics during this decade (SNP, 1966). Third, the reorganisation of the 
SNP to create a National Assembly responsible for policy debates increased the depth 
and width of SNP policies from 1968 onwards. National Assembly created a large 
number of specialist policy committees that began to generate detailed statements 
across all areas of policy, with lengthy resolutions on employment dealing with the 
minimum wage, industrial democracy, profit sharing, collective bargaining, trade 
union rights, the closed shop, pensions, equal pay, etc. a the 1969 party conference. ix 
Resolutions of similar length and detail dealt with forestry, welfare and community 
services and industrial development (SNP, 1969). Such institutional developments 
and processes are part of the reason for the perception that SNP policies became 
social democratic in the 1970s ‘by accident’ rather than simply design (Mitchell, 
1996: 207).  
 
Third, policies weren’t just adopted in order to compete with electoral opponents but 
to provide a vision of what an independent Scotland would look like.x SNP policies 
for post-independence Scotland assumed a key role for the state. This resulted from 
prevailing economic views about government intervention that ran from the war 
economy of the 1940s through the period of consensus politics in Britain that was 
seen to exist until the late 1970s.xi But, it also mirrored policies seen to be vital to 
construct and maintain an independent Scotland through central government 
intervention. Such policies were not mirror-image copies of the main parties though 
as there was a strong decentralist ethos within the SNP that was suspicious of big 
government (and of social democratic crisis, Maxwell, 1975). In addition, the post-
1979 period saw a significant recession in Scotland presided over by an unpopular 
Conservative administration instituting more free market policies: aligning with this 
type of ideological position was simply unthinkable for the SNP in this period given 
its existing policies. If the party adopted any position, it had to be on the centre-left 
and opposed to the Conservatives. 
 
In addition, some policies adopted in the 1960s were recognisably on the left. SNP 
conference in 1961 expressed the party’s opposition to the siting of the Polaris 
submarine base in Scotland. This policy was followed in 1963 by a motion opposed to 
nuclear weapons (Mitchell, 1996: 194): policy that has remained in place ever since 
and later followed by opposition to Scottish membership of NATO. Labour by 
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contrast was unilateralist in 1960, but reversed its position in 1961: a change that 
brought some members into the SNP (and helped move the SNP to the left). The 
1960s also saw the beginnings of the SNP’s efforts to establish an industrial 
organisation and mobilise amongst trade unionists in Scotland. The Association of 
Scottish Nationalist Trade Unionists was formed in 1967-8 with the intention of 
assisting the SNP to organise amongst union members and develop some presence 
within the unions locally (Lynch, 2002: 133). Promoting the SNP amongst the trade 
union membership was seen to be an important part of attracting Labour voters to 
defect to the SNP, with a trade union strategy document adopted in 1974.xii  
 
How did the voters view such development? Miller’s study of the October 1974 
general election in Scotland found some evidence of voter perceptions of the political 
parties. For example, 37% thought the SNP was closest to Labour in policy, compared 
to only 17% who thought the SNP close to the Conservatives, whilst 46% did not 
know (Miller 1981: 127). When it came to determining voters’ second choice party, 
SNP voters divided fairly evenly between all three alternative parties: 31% chose the 
Conservatives as their second choice, 35% chose Labour and 33% chose the Liberals 
(Miller, 1981: 127). However, despite some progress in the direction of social 
democracy – not least emphasising it within party publicity – there was some 
dissatisfaction amongst new SNP members about the party’s policies and ideological 
positioning. This development manifested itself after the 1979 devolution referendum 
and general election through the creation of the socialist 79 Group. 
 
The 79 Group was the first organised ideological faction within the SNP. It emerged 
at a time of ideological polarisation in both Scottish and British politics, strongly 
influenced by the experience of Mrs Thatcher’s Conservative government. The stated 
aims of the 79 Group were full independence, a Scottish republic and a socialist 
redistribution of power, income and wealth.xiii However, the type of socialism the 79 
Group had in mind was quite limited. Socialism was not defined or debated at any 
great length and the group’s aim was largely to attack the old guard and the ‘ruling 
myth’ and target the Labour electorate. The 79 Group’s critique of the SNP was 
straightforward though its solutions in terms of policy and strategy were limited. One 
79 Group member described the SNP ‘more as an apolitical party than a political one’ 
in relation to ideology and policy.xiv In essence, the group advanced little more than 
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existing SNP policy, with a few additions, plus a strategy to move to the left (Brand, 
1990: 26): however, significantly, it worked. Brand (1990) saw the 79 Group partly as 
a response to the SNP’s experience during the 1970s, when it was still pilloried by 
Labour as being ‘Tartan Tories’. New activists joined in the 1960s and 1970s and 
these members moved SNP policy and outlook to the left. Traditionalists who resisted 
a clear ideological profile for the SNP were in decline in terms of numbers and 
activism. This process of change explains why traditionalists within the SNP were 
able to use arguments about party unity to defeat and expel the 79 Group at annual 
national conferences from 1979 to 1982. But, despite this evident success,xv some of 
the 79 Group’s proposals were adopted anyway as the SNP declared itself as a centre-
left party and involved itself in a series of industrial campaigns in the early 1980s. 
Brand (1990) also argued that the political context of the post-1979 period was 
important. The new Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher was not only 
completely opposed to Scottish self-government in any form, but instituted a series of 
economic policies that brought industrial crisis and recession to Scotland. Such 
policies led the SNP into a series of industrial campaigns in the early 1980sxvi and 
such campaigning rolled forward to encompass SNP support for the miners’ strike 
(Brand, 1990: 29) as well as opposition to the poll tax after 1987: each intended to 
outflank Labour and appeal to working class voters.  
 
The Left-of Centre Consensus From the mid-1980s onwards, the SNP’s political 
identity as a left-of-centre nationalist party was established in terms of both its 
policies and electoral support. After the period of conflict around the existence of the 
79 Group, the party settled down to a period in which strategy rather than ideology 
were important. This involved civil disobedience against unemployment and the lack 
of self-government in the early 1980s, followed by a non-payment campaign against 
the poll tax in the late 1980s; modernising independence to take account of European 
integration; and debate over co-operation with its opponents to promote self-
government in the shape of the Scottish Constitutional Convention. Instead of 
debating ideology, the SNP promoted its policy stances as left of centre and sought to 
project a centre-left profile in party publicity and campaigning: especially after the 
clearly left-wing Alex Salmond became party leader in 1990. Salmond sought to 
make the SNP a credible alternative to Labour and thus attractive to Labour voters. 
This occurred in period in which the Nationalists were part of the anti-Conservative 
 17 
consensus in Scotland along with Labour and the Liberal Democrats, keen to oppose 
Conservative economic policy and also to promote Scottish self-government.  
 
By the 1990s, many voters saw the SNP as similar to Labour and each party’s 
electorate shared a large number of socio-economic and policy features (Brand, 
Mitchell and Surridge, 1994). Labour and SNP voters were most similar on the left-
right continuum and when asked about party placement on the socialist-laissez-faire 
and the liberal-authoritarian dimensions, supporters of the two were inseparable and 
clearly distinguishable from the Conservatives (and from the Liberal Democrats on 
the socialist-laissez-faire dimension) (Paterson et al, 2001: 61). In 1997, more left-
wing voters on the left-right continuum were more likely to vote Labour rather than 
SNP, but this was no longer the case in 1999 (Paterson, 2001: 63). Similarly at that 
time, there was a fall in voter images of Labour as a party that defends working class 
interests – 93% of the Scottish electorate thought (British) Labour looked after 
working class interests very or fairly closely in 1997, which fell to 53% in 1999. The 
figure for Scottish Labour was 66% - the same level as the SNP (Paterson 2001: 58). 
In addition, Labour was seen to look after middle class interests more than working 
class interests. This changed reality helped the SNP to emerge as the second most 
popular party in Scotland in the late 1990s and to cast itself as the replacement party 
to Labour. When New Labour appeared on the scene in 1994, with its concern for 
middle England, the SNP focused its attention on ‘mainstream Scotland’ (Mitchell, 
1996: 294) – promoting a moderate, centre-left identity that had broad appeal across 
Scotland. 
 
The End of Ideology? In the period from 1999 onwards, the SNP’s policy profile 
became more mixed and its centre-left profile was de-emphasised – evident in its 
manifesto commitments for the 2003 and 2007 Scottish elections and in relation to its 
programme in government. The success of New Labour in dominating the centre 
ground of politics from the mid-1990s was an instructive lesson for the SNP. Labour 
was seen to practice a strategy of triangulation towards its opponents – occupying 
some of their traditional ground whilst relocating Labour’s position on its own issues. 
This strategy caused difficulties for the Conservatives, with Labour staking out new 
policies on the economy, immigration and law and order. In Scotland, such issues 
included land reform (Scottish new Labour 1999), which the SNP had been working 
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on for a number of years through a special Land Commission. Labour made it more 
difficult for the SNP to stake out distinctive positions and, in time, the SNP learned 
this lesson and sought to produce policies that were eye-catching but also spanned the 
centre-ground of Scottish politics – with the important caveat that the centre ground 
in Scotland is perceived as a left of centre one. Thus in 2003 and 2007, the SNP 
sought strong policies on law and order issues, economic growth and business 
development (SNP, 2003, 2007),xvii as well as a pronounced small government agenda 
in 2007 involving efficiency savings, a government reorganisation and a reduction in 
Quangos (SNP, 2007). In addition, the party was active in seeking support within the 
business community, building on the work of Business for Scotland, an organization 
established by SNP supporters in 1998. The strategy of this organization was to 
bolster arguments around the economics of independence through business 
supporters. Key members produced a new analysis of the Scottish economy based 
around the need for domestic business growth and fiscal autonomy in 2001-2 that was 
taken around the boardrooms of Scottish businesses. In addition, the organization 
helped generate high profile supporters of the SNP at the 2007 Scottish election who, 
in some cases, provided substantial donations to the party’s election campaign. 
However, such pro-business policies co-exist with a strong commitment to the public 
sector. For instance, in government, the SNP cancel a Scottish government 
programme for a private prison at Bishopbriggs near Glasgow and to reform the 
Public Private Partnership programme to reduce private sector profits and produce 
more value for money for the public sector (Scottish Government 2007a). 
 
However, it’s not just Labour’s reorientation that was influential for the SNP, but also 
the need to adapt to the complexity of a multi-party system combining FPTP and 
regional lists – in a period in which the political conflict was suddenly free from the 
anti-Conservative politics of the elections from 1979-97. Not only were the SNP 
faced with FPTP contests with a range of parties, but also faced the challenge of 
multi-party competition on the regional lists, whilst also trying to present the SNP as a 
responsible alternative party of government. In this sense, the party faced a range of 
difficulties as it was pulled in different directions. After the 2003 election reverse, 
there was pressure on the SNP leadership to turn to the left to recover support from 
the Greens and SSP – in contrast to its moderate manifesto, pro-business in 2003 that 
had sought to act as a programme for government. However, rather than change 
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policy, the SNP changed leader – with Salmond’s return in 2004. This change opened 
the door to a more successful and personalised regional list vote strategy – vote Alex 
Salmond for First Minister a the top of each regional ballot paper – that didn’t focus 
on ideology at all but on personality. Similarly, there was little mention of the SNP’s 
social democracy in the party’s manifesto or campaigning, with much more emphasis 
on policies to improve the public sector and to generate economic growth. However, 
rather than arguing that this is an indication of the SNP abandoning social democracy, 
it’s more likely that the party no longer feels the need to stress its ideological identity 
at a time of ideological convergence given that it has achieved its goal of narrowing 
the gap with Labour. 
 
What seems to be observable now in terms of electoral behaviour has some parallels 
with the 1970s. Part of the SNP’s success over time, rather than simply in 2007, can 
be related to class dealignment as the links between socio-economic status and voting 
have weakened and working and middle class voters have been more fluid in their 
electoral behaviour. This phenomenon was observable in the 1970s as well as more 
recently. Brand (1978: 146-7)) used data from the mid-1970s to determine the cross-
class nature of SNP support and the party’s challenge to notions of class voting. 
Though class voting still has some role in Scottish elections (Bennie et al, 1997), 
dealignment has occurred to provide opportunities for the SNP as well as a challenge 
for the other parties. Indeed, rather than focus on social class explanations of electoral 
behaviour, some recent studies have sought to employ the concept of valence politics 
to explain some of the reasons for the outcome of the 2007 Scottish election (Johns et 
al, 2007). Valence explanations focus on voter perceptions of a party’s capacity to 
deliver its policy goals  - rather than the detail of the policies themselves. This model 
was seen to have validity as it offered explanatory potential at a time in which there 
was ideological convergence between the main parties – witnessed by the closeness of 
the SNP and Labour – and class dealignment, explained in part through the fact that 
the working class has shrunk through social mobility (Paterson, 2006: 50-1). 
Similarly, in 2007, 52.5% of voters did not identify with a political party, creating a 
more open electorate to appeal to through valence issues through positive 
campaigning. In this context, ideological or social class appeals are seen to be less 
relevant than party and leader images and the ability to use the constitutional issue ‘to 
stand up for Scotland’ (Johns et al, 2007: 6). Stressing issues, image and leadership 
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over a consensual ideological position shared by other parties was therefore seen to be 
advantageous as well as an important adaptation to a changing party system and 
electorate. 
 
Office Success and the Multi-level Dimension 
 
The establishment of the devolved parliament in Edinburgh in 1999 created the 
primary arena for SNP activity, eclipsing both Westminster and the European 
Parliament. All the SNP’s Westminster MPs became MSPs in 1999 with the party 
aiming at forming a government in Edinburgh rather than being a marginal presence 
at Westminster and in Brussels. The size of the SNP contingent in the Scottish 
Parliament, the fact that the bulk of its leadership was elected to this body and that it 
was the main opposition party all enhanced this arena above all others. The SNP was 
still active at Westminster, often in alliance with Plaid Cymru and in the European 
Parliament with the European Free Alliance and Greens, but Edinburgh and 
government office became the main focus of its activities. This situation increased in 
2007, when government rather than just parliament were the main focus of its multi-
level activities. 
 
The SNP formed a minority government at Holyrood following the party’s marginal 
victory at the 2007 Scottish election. Having faced the challenges of adaptation to a 
changing party system and electorate, the party is now faced with adapting to life in 
government and to its impact on its fundamental territorial goal of independence. The 
minority status of the SNP government has conditioned its performance in office. 
Though, the party achieved office through a co-operation agreement with the 
Greens,xviii it has also been reliant upon its opponents for support on key issues – 
trading policy commitments with the Conservatives on policing and business taxation 
in exchange for support for its budget and also seeking consensus with the Liberal 
Democrats over issues such as local taxation. The lack of fundamental divisions 
between the parties on some issues plus the SNP’s flexibility were important here as 
discussed extensively above. However, governing has not been easy in relation to 
passing legislation or passing budgets, as each required careful management and 
compromise (Lynch and Elias 2009). 
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Second, the minority status of the government has actually helped the SNP in relation 
to its territorial goal as it could promote independence and the notion of an 
independence referendum in office, instead of being forced to compromise on 
independence through coalition negotiations. The SNP published a government white 
paper on Scotland’s constitutional future (Scottish Government, 2007) and began a 
consultation exercise on the issue that has run since 2007 with a series of meetings 
across Scotland and online forums on constitutional change. The other parties 
responded by establishing a commission to investigate further devolution that 
recommended some changes to the powers and financing of the Scottish Parliament 
(Commission on Scottish Devolution 2009). Therefore the Nationalists have been 
successful in setting the political agenda to some extent. How this issue will actually 
work out in future is difficult to tell, especially as when the SNP attempts to 
implement its referendum pledge. Goal moderation is explicit within the government 
white paper. However, as yet the SNP has faced no compromise over its territorial 
goals and consequently no internal conflict over the issue. 
 
Two other developments within the multi-level political setting are relevant to the 
SNP’s brief period in office so far. First, the party has been adept at adopting a more 
assertive approach to intergovernmental relations towards the UK government as well 
as seeking alliances with the two other regional governments in the UK – the 
Northern Ireland executive and the Welsh Assembly Government. The SNP has been 
involved in discussions with the other governments and keen to re-establish the 
formal mechanisms for intergovernmental dialogue – the Joint Ministerial Committee 
– that had fallen into disuse under the previous administrations.xix There were also 
joint discussions over the financial powers and functioning of the different assemblies 
and governments in relation to public expenditure during the recession.  
 
Second, the triple impact of SNP success in Scotland, Labour’s serious electoral 
difficulties in 2007-8 plus the electoral popularity of the Conservatives (in England) 
has given the UK dimension of multi-level elections renewed importance. In 
Scotland, there is the prospect of the SNP capitalising on its position and popularity to 
win a number of seats at the next UK election from Labour. At the 2009 European 
elections, the SNP took first place with 29.1% of the vote to Labour’s 20.8%. The 
SNP also achieved first place in 22 of the 32 Scottish local authority areas. In 
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addition, there is the prospect of electoral change at the UK level in the near future – 
in the shape of a Conservative government or minority administration, This 
development will significantly alter the SNP’s political opportunity structure at both 
Holyrood and Westminster. Not only would the political reality of a Conservative 
government at Westminster transform the context for an independence referendum in 
2010, but a UK minority administration or one with a slim minority would present 
opportunities for the SNP to extract policy concessions if it had a sizeable contingent 
of MPs with some bargaining power in the House of Commons.xx The interaction 
between the different levels of politics at the level of both government institutions and 





This paper has sought to outline the SNP’s ideological development since its 
formation in 1934 in the context of adaptation to party system change and the onset of 
multi-level electoral and governmental settings. It traced the party’s evolution from a 
non-ideological organisation to one in which a ‘ruling myth’ was advanced as a 
justification for staying away from class politics. This period gave way to one in 
which new members and organisational growth produced a more social democratic 
party, followed by a period of ideological contestation with the 79 Group after the 
referendum and general election of 1979. That period seems a world away from the 
current SNP as it appears the polar opposite to the consensual, ideology-lite (and 
electorally successful) Nationalist party and government currently in office – even 
though some of the same individuals are prominent in each period. A large number of 
things have changed to facilitate this situation such as the SNP’s ideological 
convergence with Labour, Labour’s own policy repositioning under New Labour, the 
onset of devolution, the complexities of a multi-party system in which the SNP has to 
compete with the right, left and centre, as well as changes in the social and partisan 
composition of the Scottish electorate. It should also be pointed out that the SNP is 
not alone in reforming its social democracy to take account of changed political and 
socio-economic circumstances – this is a much more general phenomenon. However, 
since 2007, the SNP has faced the challenge of adapting to government office, in 
terms of policy delivery and government performance but also – most importantly for 
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a regionalist party – the impact of office success on the party’s fundamental territorial 
goal of independence. Will government office help the SNP to deliver independence? 
Or, as is more common for regionalist parties in government, will it preside over 
staged transfers of autonomy? Either scenario will be contingent not only on its own 
performance in office but on the responses of the other political parties and 
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